23 October 1978

NOTE FOR: Mr. Robert W. Gambino

25X1 FROM:

SUBJECT: Community-Wide Computer Assisted
Compartmentation Control System (4C)

    1. Attached is the wrap-up of the 4C Requirements
Team. It contains questions and reservations received from
the Community following your call for final comments. Each
issue is addressed by the Team. Some of them can only be
resolved in the course of the next phase - development of
formal specifications.

    2. A decision to go or not to go is needed within
six months or else the data will be out-of-date and the
knowledgeable people will be scattered.

    3. If there is a decision to go - the next step is
formation of a "Specifications Team" made up of people from
CIB, ODP, OC. We think it would be impossible to get ODP and
OC to contribute manpower resources without a firm commitment
of funds. No one wants to bet on the come in this day and
age. Looks like you have to go to the DCI for money or
decision not to progress.

    4. Recommend you sign and return to me and I'll have
SSC dissem.

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SECOM-D-392

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the DCI Security Committee

FROM: Robert W. Gambino
                  Chairman
                  DCI Security Committee

SUBJECT: Community-Wide Computer Assisted
                  Compartmentation Control System (4C) (U)

REFERENCE: SECOM-D-345, 26 June 1978, same Subject

    1.   (U) Responses to the Requirements Package were unanimously supportive of the 4C concept, but there were questions and reservations about some elements. These are set forth as ITEMs, followed by COMMENTs, which have been prepared by the 4C Requirements Team.

ITEM A: (U) Paragraph 6.2 of reference describes a system which seems based on the assumption that some NFIB members will choose not to make all, or most, of their SCI record holdings available for retrieval by all other members. Some members observed that this would greatly reduce the benefits of 4C.

COMMENT: (U) The Requirements Team and most of the participating organizations have perceived 4C as an information bank which can be used to ascertain whether individuals have been authorized accesses to SCI, to identify the Sponsors, to obtain information concerning background investigations, to verify term certifications, etc. It is planned that such information will be available within secure Government-controlled areas from 4C terminals operated by cleared personnel. Under such conditions the information will be protected, and its ready availability to people with a need-to-know will reduce the telephone calls, cables, memos, and some travel now required to perform necessary business.

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Such benefits will be reduced if participating organizations elect, without sound reasons, to make their records inaccessible to other NFIB organizations.

There are sound reasons, however, for exceptionally tight protection of some records. The 4C system must provide the option of making a record inaccessible except to the Sponsor and to the Central Facility. Without such option, some members might feel obliged to withhold certain records, in which case the DCI requirement of a complete data base would not be satisfied.

ITEM B: (C) There are differing opinions concerning the proper classification of the 4C data base, and the question of whether 4C information should be transmitted and stored in compartmented channels. (The draft Requirements Package proposed that the data be SECRET and not compartmented. The final package, as a result of comment to the draft, stated that the 4C data base, and 4C information transmitted or stored, must be classified SECRET and handled via BYE channels.)

COMMENT: (C) The BSO CIA, after considering the reply to the draft, agreed that the data base as a whole should not be available outside of BYE channels, and that the classification of SECRET was appropriate.

Over the years we have handled a similar data base (SPECLE) as SECRET. Individual records within such data bases have been handled as unclassified and uncompartmented, and listings of all individuals sponsored by some Agencies/ Departments have been handled as CONFIDENTIAL, or even unclassified, and uncompartmented.

With existing SCI access approval record-keeping systems we have had human intervention at central facilities between remote queries and responses to those remote queries. The human intervention has provided protection against releasing information to unauthorized individuals or those who have no "need-to-know". It has protected individuals who are under cover. It has permitted us to assign proper classification, and to properly channel reports which are transmitted to customers.

It is essential to provide suitable protection against unauthorized release of information while maintaining efficiency

in processing and accessing 4C information. The Requirements Team concluded that, on balance, optimum results would be obtained by establishing rigorous security measures (hardware, software, personnel, encryption, emanation and physical) for the system as a whole. It was assumed that this would encourage the input of all SCI access approval records, simplify the system's internal security features and encourage members to make their records available to other Agencies/Departments (see Item A, above).

The Specifications Team will give additional attention to this problem, and will explore various possibilities for improving system efficiency while protecting the information.

ITEM C: (U) Several members question the plan to implement Phase 1 of 4C without a positive commitment to proceed to Phases 2 and 3, with all remote stations (CONUS and Overseas) identified and included in cost estimates.

COMMENT: (U) With implementation of Phase 1, in order to achieve a current data base, it is anticipated that there will be increased utilization of cables to expedite the recording of indoctrinations or debriefings which occur at distant points. The degree of success in utilization of cable facilities may influence the determination of Phase 2 and Phase 3 requirements.

It is safe to predict that there will be changes in the locations of activities, the volumes of recordable actions at the various locations, and there will be changes in methods and technology which will impact on requirements and costs of Phases 2 and 3.

ITEM D: (U) Some members, with widely dispersed indoctrination/debriefing and certification operations, are dubious about their ability to maintain a current 4C data base.

COMMENT: (U) This Item is closely related to Item C, above. The Requirements Team, in questioning the economic feasibility of placing on-line interactive terminals at each of the many scattered points around the world, has costed a system in which there will be some delay between events and the recording of those events in 4C. The 4C system was costed

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for Phase 2 and Phase 3 expansion only to points having a relatively high volume of activity. During Phase 1, with expanded use of existing cable facilities, there can be great improvement in the timeliness of the central data base.

ITEM E: (U) Some members have expressed concern about the increased work load in developing 4C and in maintaining their existing system plus the 4C system after it becomes operational. They are dubious about availability of manpower.

COMMENT: (U) Organizations with large numbers of records and existing ADP systems will be expected to provide manpower to work with the Specifications Team as required, to assist in the conversion of data to 4C specifications, and may need to operate parallel systems during an operational test period. 4C is a major project which will not succeed without manpower support from participating organizations.

Adequate support from each member of the Community is essential for the success of 4C. The Requirements Team did not attempt to assess the amount of manpower support which will be required from each participating organization.

The Requirements Team did not conduct a Costs/Benefits analysis, but did conclude that 4C has the potential to replace some existing ADP systems, and eliminate some redundancies in keypunching, computer processing, and storage. Also, with 4C replacing some existing systems, there will be a considerable reduction in computer programming in the Community. Correction of "bugs" or system enhancements in 4C will benefit all participating organizations, and less work will be required to exchange data between systems.

ITEM F: (U) Is the CIA paying for all costs, except for salaries of employees who will participate in development, operation, and maintenance of 4C?

COMMENT: (C) No. Each participating organization will be expected to provide and prepare appropriate space for peripheral equipment. The space should be ready at the time the equipment is scheduled for installation.

In buildings which are serviced by Tetrahedron, the participating organizations should arrange for installation of lines from the Technical Control Facility (in their building) to areas where 4C peripheral equipment will be installed.

ITEM G: (C) The assumption that the KG-84 would be available in time to meet the cryptographic needs of 4C was questioned.

COMMENT: (C) It now appears that the KG-84 will not be available within the expected time frame. Consequently, the KG-34 would have to be used instead of the KG-84.

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ITEM H: (U) Some NFIB members have surfaced possible requirements for additional terminal equipment and communications facilities at locations which were not mentioned during the study of requirements. One member advised that a planned centralization of operations would reduce such requirements. On balance, the responses to SECOM-D-345 have indicated an increase in Phase 1 requirements for terminals and communications.

COMMENT: (U) The Requirements Team costed a central facility which can service additional remote terminals. If there is a decision to implement Phase 1 of 4C with a fixed amount of money not sufficient to meet all immediate requirements, it may be necessary to postpone installation of equipment at some remote sites.

ITEM I: (U) There were questions or comments concerning various matters, which were not studied in detail by the Requirements Team. Some examples are: (1) the definitions of Data Fields, both required and optional; (2) the methods to be used in updating two systems, when 4C can not replace an existing ADP system; (3) the need to maintain an audit trail on queries (Privacy Act and security considerations); and (4) the use of AUTODIN.

COMMENT: (U) With the assistance of participating organizations, these are questions which will be addressed and resolved by the Specifications Team.

2. (U) Reservations, as described above, will be considered when I participate in discussions of 4C funding. You will be notified promptly when the decision is made.

3. (U) Thank you for your assistance in conducting the 4C requirements and costing study.

Robert W. Gambino

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